Euracoal-2012年年度報告（2012年）EURACOAL-Annual-Report-2012(2012)

與氣候和能源政策相比，歐元危機在2012年繼續主導著(zhù)歐盟政治——各地的政治家都在努力尋找恢復經(jīng)濟增長(cháng)的持久措施。事實(shí)證明，緊縮措施不受歡迎，尤其是考慮到能源價(jià)格仍居高不下。廉價(jià)頁(yè)巖氣對美國經(jīng)濟的提振，不太可能在歐盟(eu)得到體現，歐盟的重要成員國反對開(kāi)采頁(yè)巖氣。相反，“綠色增長(cháng)”的概念在德國得到了推廣，尤其是在德國，“Energiewende”(能源轉型)加入了一些德語(yǔ)詞匯——從焦慮到時(shí)代精神——成為英語(yǔ)的一部分。德國能源轉型的成本已經(jīng)很高，而且可能還會(huì )進(jìn)一步升高，因為單位電力成本并沒(méi)有下降，而是隨著(zhù)更多的風(fēng)能和光伏發(fā)電投入使用而上升。值得慶幸的是，德國仍有能力利用煤炭和褐煤來(lái)滿(mǎn)足近一半的電力需求。2012年，中國關(guān)閉了800萬(wàn)千瓦的核電站，天然氣價(jià)格如此之高，可再生能源的補貼日益扭曲了發(fā)電順序，以至于即便是最新的CCGT核電站也處于閑置狀態(tài)，而煤炭和褐煤卻享有令人垂涎的基本負荷市場(chǎng)。2012年，德國的煤炭和褐煤產(chǎn)量增長(cháng)了4%，在Boxberg和Neurath新建了大型發(fā)電機組。在第18屆締約方會(huì )議上，盡管多哈會(huì )議最后36小時(shí)的會(huì )議創(chuàng )下了紀錄，但沒(méi)有取得重大進(jìn)展。自1992年在巴西里約熱內盧召開(kāi)第一次聯(lián)合國氣候變化框架公約(UNFCCC)以來(lái)，二氧化碳排放量增加了40%以上?！毒┒甲h定書(shū)》和歐盟的氣候政策都沒(méi)有對這一趨勢產(chǎn)生任何明顯的影響。此外，加拿大已經(jīng)退出了1997年的《京都議定書(shū)》，而許多其他締約方不愿承擔任何后京都議定書(shū)規定的進(jìn)一步減排負擔。在煤炭使用量不斷上升的背景下，歐盟的氣候和能源政策面臨巨大挑戰。有關(guān)溫室氣體減排和可再生能源的20-20-20協(xié)議目標很可能在2020年前實(shí)現，但任何未來(lái)目標的實(shí)現都將困難得多。這是因為所有的低碳選擇現在看起來(lái)比希望的更昂貴。天然氣越來(lái)越依賴(lài)進(jìn)口，而昂貴的液化天然氣只能滿(mǎn)足有限的需求。管道天然氣供應與油價(jià)密切相關(guān)，但天然氣的競爭對手是煤炭，而非石油。由于許多原因，核能的資本成本遠遠超過(guò)了幾年前的估計?？稍偕茉凑谧兊酶F，而不是更少，這可能是因為大多數補貼計劃沒(méi)有充分鼓勵經(jīng)濟效率。2007年，歐盟各國部長(cháng)同意支持10-12個(gè)示范項目，但他們希望歐盟能盡快發(fā)展二氧化碳捕獲與封存技術(shù)(CCS)。經(jīng)濟危機導致歐盟成員國削減開(kāi)支，CCS項目也受到影響，盡管歐盟已經(jīng)拿出了資金。與其他低碳技術(shù)一樣，CCS技術(shù)成本高昂，但歐盟必須迅速推進(jìn)這一重要技術(shù)的示范。如果我們不這樣做，那么我們就沒(méi)有什么東西可以提供給世界其他地方，因為世界越來(lái)越多地轉向用煤炭來(lái)發(fā)電。采取這種務(wù)實(shí)的做法也有助于結束目前《聯(lián)合國氣候變化框架公約》談判的僵局(專(zhuān)欄1，第4頁(yè))。

More than climate and energy policy, the euro crisis continued to dominate  EU politics during 2012 – politicians everywhere struggled to find durable  measures to restore economic growth. Austerity measures proved to be  unpopular, especially given that energy prices remained stubbornly high.  The boost given to the US economy by cheap shale gas is not likely to be  mirrored in the European Union, with important Member States against its  exploitation. Instead, the concept of “green growth” is promoted, nowhere  more so than in Germany where “Energiewende” has joined a handful of  German words – from angst to zeitgeist – to become part of the English  language. The costs of the German energy transition, already high, are likely  to become higher still because the unit costs of electricity are not falling, but  rising as more wind and more PV are commissioned. Thankfully, Germany  still has the capacity to generate almost half of its electricity needs from  coal and lignite. Following the closure of 8 GW of nuclear plants in 2012 and  with gas prices so high and subsidised renewables increasingly distorting  the merit order such that even the newest CCGT plants are lying idle, coal  and lignite have enjoyed the coveted base-load market. In 2012, coal and  lignite production grew by 4% in Germany with the opening of large new  generation units at Boxberg and Neurath.

At the 18th Conference of the Parties there was no great progress, despite a record-breaking 36-hour final session in Doha. Since the first United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, CO2 emissions have increased by more than 40%. Neither the Kyoto Protocol nor EU climate policy have had any discernible impact on this trend. Moreover, Canada has withdrawn from the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and many other parties are not willing to bear the burdens of further emission cuts under any post-Kyoto agreement.

Against this backdrop of rising coal use, EU climate and energy policy faces deep challenges. The agreed 20-20-20 targets for GHG emission reductions and renewables are likely to be met by 2020, but any future targets will be much more difficult to deliver. This is because all of the low-carbon options now look to be more expensive than hoped. Natural gas is increasingly imported, with expensive LNG meeting marginal demand. Pipeline gas supplies are resolutely linked to oil prices – yet gas competes against coal, not oil. For many reasons, the capital cost of nuclear far exceeds estimates made just a few years ago. Renewable energy sources are becoming more expensive, not less, possibly because most subsidy schemes have not sufficiently encouraged economic efficiency. Carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS) has not developed as quickly in the EU as ministers had hoped back in 2007 when they agreed to support 10-12 demonstration projects. The economic crisis saw Member States rein in their spending and CCS projects suffered, despite money on the table from the EU. Like other low-carbon technologies, CCS is expensive, but the EU must move ahead quickly with  the promised demonstration of this important technology. If we  don’t, then   we have little to offer the rest of the world as it turns increasingly to coal for competitive electricity generation. Taking such a pragmatic approach could also contribute to ending the stalemate of current  UNFCCC  negotiations (Box 1, page 4).